Abstract In this brief discussion piece I try to offer some considerations in favor of the so-called Simple Intention Theory of demonstratives, which is rejected by Gómez-Torrente. I try to show that the main argument offered against the Simple Intention Theory appears to be based on false data.

Abstract In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspectival contents.

ABSTRACT In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.

RESUMO Neste artigo, primeiramente, apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conhecimento de verdades contingentes a priori e a crítica de Keith Donnellan a essa tese. Depois, exploro a distinção que Donnellan faz entre (a) saber que uma sentença é verdadeira e (b) conhecer a verdade que essa sentença expressa. Argumento que essa distinção não é relevante apenas no contexto de sua crítica ao contingente a priori, mas sim para nossa prática com nomes próprios de modo geral. Tento mostrar que conhecer o significado de nomes próprios não se resume à nossa competência linguística com eles, mas depende de termos acquaintance com seus portadores. Se isso é verdadeiro, então a tese do contingente a priori, tal como formulada por Kripke, não pode estar correta.

ABSTRACT In this paper I first present Kripke's thesis regarding the possibility of acquiring a priori knowledge of contingent truths and Keith Donnellan's criticism of this thesis. Second, I explore a distinction that Donnellan makes between (a) knowing that a sentence expresses a truth and (b) knowing what truth this sentence expresses. I argue that this distinction is not relevant only in the context of his criticism of the contingent a priori, but also to our practices with proper names in general. I try to show that knowing the meaning of proper names cannot be reduced to our linguistic competence with them, but that it depends on an acquaintance relation to their bearers. If this is true, then the thesis of the contingent a priori, as formulated by Kripke, cannot be correct.

Abstract: In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential semantics to all subject-phrases. I offer a brief overview of its four chapters and point out some of their virtues and shortcomings.

Abstract In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.